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Federal Magistrate Court of Appeals:
Whether Magistrate Judge
Disposition of Section 2255 Motions
Under Consent Jurisdiction Is
Statutorily and Constitutionally
Permissible
Corey J. Hauser*
Abstract
For decades the Supreme Court has balanced the tension
between judicial efficiency and adherence to our constitutional
system of separation of powers. As more cases were filed in
federal courts, Congress increased the responsibilities and power
given to magistrate judges. The result is magistrate judges
wielding as much power as district judges. With post-conviction
relief under § 2255, magistrate judges take on a whole new
role—appellate judge—reviewing and potentially overturning
sentences imposed by district judges.
This practice raises two concerns. First, did Congress intend
to statutorily give magistrate judges this power? The prevailing
interpretation is that § 2255 motions are civil, not criminal,
proceedings able to be disposed of by magistrates. Still, at least
one circuit court has disagreed, holding that § 2255 motions are
criminal proceedings, incapable of magistrate disposition.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2021, Washington and Lee University School of
Law. Thank you to Professor Joan M. Shaughnessy for all of her advice and
support in writing this Note. Thank you to the Washington and Lee Law
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Second, even if magistrate judges have statutory jurisdiction to
decide § 2255 motions, does the practice violate separation of
powers? When magistrate judges determine the validity of
district judge-imposed sentences, non-Article III judges are given
final say on whether an Article III judge sentenced an individual
correctly.
This Note argues magistrate judge disposition of § 2255
motions is statutorily and constitutionally impermissible. It
recommends that Congress limit magistrate judge power in
§ 2255 motions to issuing reports and recommendations,
reviewed by district court judges. This recommendation achieves
the twin aims of judicial efficiency and constitutionality,
protecting the Judiciary, and the People, from intra-branch
encroachment.
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Introduction

That inflexibility and uniform adherence to the rights of the
Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be
indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be
expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary
commission. Periodical appointments, however regulated, or
by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal
to their necessary independence.1

This quote, from Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78,
explains the independence Article III judges must have to
ensure fairness and impartiality for litigants. Built into Article
III of the Constitution are certain protections—independence
among the three branches of government, life tenure, and the
inability for Congress to diminish the salary of judges. 2 At the
same time, our crowded judicial system depends on many
non-Article III adjuncts to promote efficiency. As Justice
Sotomayor said, “it is no exaggeration to say that without the
distinguished service of these judicial colleagues, the work of the
federal court system would grind nearly to a halt.”3
Magistrate judges have become an important part of the
federal judiciary. Since their inception, Congress and the courts
have continued to expand magistrate judge power. Most
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 572 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
3. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1938–39
(2015).
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expansions provide, however, that district courts must “check”
magistrate judge power. For example, magistrate judges may
decide dispositive motions in civil cases.4 But the district court
must review and adopt that recommendation before it is binding
on the litigants5—ensuring that a district judge, with the
protections of Article III, enters final judgment in the case.
Consent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) does away
with those protections.6 Section 636(c) allows magistrate judges
to adjudicate any jury or nonjury “civil matter” so long as the
parties consent.7 This means that a magistrate judge may enter
final judgment in a case without review by a district judge.8
While this system is facially troubling, in the context of habeas
corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, it is inapposite of
statutory and constitutional principles.
Section 2255 allows a prisoner to move for a sentencing
reduction in the district that sentenced him—even though he
can no longer appeal to a circuit court.9 These motions require
the reviewing judge (the one adjudicating the motion) to decide
whether the sentencing judge (typically the trial judge in the
case) was correct in her determination. When magistrate judges
adjudicate these motions, a non-Article III adjunct is put in the
awkward position of determining whether a district judge was
correct in her sentence. And because consent jurisdiction
permits the magistrate judge to enter final judgment, the
district judge has no ability to review the magistrate’s decision.
That system turns the relationship between magistrate and
district judges on its head because district judges appoint and

4. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
5. Id. § 636(b)(1)(C).
6. See id. § 636(c)(1) (codifying “consent jurisdiction” for magistrate
judges).
7. See id. (establishing that the court may remedy a violation by
vacating, setting aside, or correcting the movant’s sentence).
8. See id. (permitting magistrate judges, once consent is obtained, to
“order the entry of judgment”); § 636(c)(3) (stating that an aggrieved party
may only take appeal “to the appropriate United States court of appeals from
the judgment of the magistrate judge”).
9. See id. § 2255 (allowing movants to collaterally attack criminal
proceedings).
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supervise magistrate judges.10 Put plainly, a magistrate judge
reviewing a § 2255 motion is like you giving your boss a
quarterly review, instead of your boss giving you one.
This practice raises two concerns vis à vis § 2255 motions.
First, as a matter of statutory interpretation, is a § 2255 motion
a “civil matter” capable of adjudication by a magistrate judge
under § 636(c)? Second, supposing § 2255 motions fall within
the jurisdictional language of § 636(c), does a magistrate judge
reviewing and vacating a district judge’s earlier sentence violate
principles of separation of powers?
A circuit split currently exists as to whether § 2255 motions
fall within a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction under § 636(c).11
While § 2255 is technically separate from traditional habeas
corpus relief,12 it shares many of the same characteristics of a
habeas proceeding.13 Habeas corpus is a petition used to bring a
person before a court to determine the legality of that person’s
confinement.14 Because of the similarities between § 2255 and
traditional habeas corpus, some courts have concluded § 2255
motions, like habeas petitions, are civil proceedings. 15 Other
courts have taken the opposite position, classifying § 2255
motions as criminal proceedings.16 This classification is
important because magistrate judges can only adjudicate “civil

10. See 28 U.S.C. § 631 (describing the appointment, qualifications, and
tenure of magistrate judges).
11. Compare United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding that § 2255 motions fall within § 636(c) jurisdiction), and United
States v. Bryson, 981 F.2d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 1992) (concluding that magistrate
judges may adjudicate § 2255 motions where the criminal case was a
misdemeanor), with Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1068 (11th Cir.
2014) (avoiding the constitutional issue and ruling § 2255 proceedings are not
civil matters for purposes of § 636(c)(1)).
12. See Ira P. Robbins, Magistrate Judges, Article III, and the Power to
Preside over Federal Prisoner Section 2255 Proceedings, 2002 FED. CTS. L. REV.
2, V.A.1 (“Although similar in purpose, § 2254 and § 2255 have distinguishing
features . . . .”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (codifying general habeas corpus
relief); id. § 2254 (permitting collateral attack of state court-imposed
sentences that violate the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States).
13. See Robbins, supra note 12, at V.A.3 (“§ 2255 is analogous to § 2254.”).
14. Habeas Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
15. See infra notes 141–146 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 156–160 and accompanying text.

Hauser.PostBlueline.docx (Do Not Delete)

1964

1/15/2021 5:01 PM

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1959 (2020)

matter[s]” under § 636(c).17 Courts also look to the text and
legislative history of § 636(c), to determine whether the drafters
intended “civil matter” to include habeas and § 2255 motions.18
Assuming § 2255 motions fall within magistrate judges’
statutory jurisdiction, the practice still raises Article III
separation of powers concerns.19 Separation of powers ensures
that (1) individuals have their cases heard by a judge free from
the control of another branch of government and (2) the
essential attributes of judicial power remain with Article III
judges.20 When a magistrate judge adjudicates a § 2255 motion,
she sits as a quasi-appellate judge, reviewing and potentially
overturning a decision made by a district judge.21 This situation
turns reviewability22 on its head and divests the district courts
of Article III power, causing some courts to rule the practice
unconstitutional.23
Recently, however, the Supreme Court decided that party
consent can go a long way to diminish, if not cure, separation of
powers concerns.24 If litigant consent cures, magistrate judges
can continue adjudicating § 2255 motions under § 636(c) so long
as both parties consent. But if consent cannot diminish or cure
this violation, then the practice violates separation of powers
17. See infra Part III.B.2.
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (“[A] United States magistrate
judge . . . may conduct any and all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter
and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” (emphasis added)).
19. See United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 367 (5th Cir. 2001)
(raising the constitutional issue).
20. See id. (explaining why the doctrine of separation of powers applies
to the judicial branch).
21. See infra notes 309–310 and accompanying text.
22. Reviewability is the idea that magistrate judge determinations are
subject to “district court review and control.” Johnston, 258 F.3d at 371; see
§ 636(b)(1)(C) (giving district courts de novo review of reports and
recommendations prepared by magistrate judges); § 636(c)(4) (permitting
district courts to vacate civil matter references to magistrate judges for good
cause).
23. See Johnston, 258 F.3d at 372 (holding that consensual reference of a
§ 2255 motion to a magistrate judge violates the doctrine of separation of
powers).
24. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1946 n.10
(2015) (concluding that a bankruptcy judge may dispose of a state law claim if
all parties consent).
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and district courts must change the way magistrate judges
participate in § 2255 proceedings.
Part II of this Note provides background on magistrate
judges and habeas corpus relief under § 2255. Part III
introduces the circuit split over whether § 2255 motions are
“civil matters” under § 636(c) jurisdiction. Part III then
classifies § 2255 motions as either criminal, civil, or a hybrid
proceeding, and determines whether they are a “civil matter”
under § 636(c). Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on Article III separation of powers, including its
most recent decision in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v.
Sharif.25 Part IV also discusses three lower court cases which
have addressed whether magistrate judges may constitutionally
adjudicate § 2255 motions. Part IV then provides a framework
for determining whether litigant consent can cure any
separation of powers concerns. Finally, this Note concludes by
recommending that Congress limit magistrate judges to issuing
reports and recommendations reviewed by a district judge on
§ 2255 motions.26
II.

Overview of the Magistrate Judge System and § 2255
Proceedings

Magistrate judges trace their roots to the United States
Commissioner System of the late eighteenth century.27 The
qualifications and duties of magistrate judges have changed
much since this early system.28 This Part discusses the history
of magistrate judge statutes, the expansion of the magistrate
judge system, and the methods used by district courts to assign
them cases. Part II.D then explains the history of habeas corpus
and the development of 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
A.

United States Commissioners

Congress originally permitted “any person having authority
from a circuit court . . . which authority . . . any circuit
25.
26.
27.
28.

135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
See infra note 362 and accompanying text.
See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.B.
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court . . . may give to one or more discreet persons learned in the
law” to take bail in criminal cases.29 This use of non-Article III
adjudicators, appointed by the circuit courts, set the stage for
the creation of the United States Commissioner System.30
Congress formally established the United States Commissioner
System in 1896.31 From the start, the jurisdictional scope of
these adjuncts was in question.32 Many courts took the view that
commissioner jurisdiction was equivalent to that of a justice of
the peace.33 This meant commissioners were limited to
adjudicating non-civil cases, holding probable cause hearings,
issuing search and arrest warrants, setting bail, and trying
petty offenses.34
The commissioner system operated this way for nearly
one-hundred years.35 Then in the 1960s, Congress decided it was
time for major changes to the commissioner system because of a
lack of formal procedures in hearings, a limited jurisdictional
scope, and only 30 percent of commissioners lacking any formal

29. Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 4, 1 Stat. 333 (emphasis added). There
was no formal education requirement for these adjudicators and the
qualifications were left to the discretion of the circuit courts. Id.
30. See Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., The Federal Magistrates Act: History and
Development, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 565, 566 (discussing the reasons for creating
the new commissioner system).
31. See PETER G. MCCABE, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SYSTEM, FED. BAR ASS’N 7 n.4 (2014), https://perma.cc/P8BG-A76D (PDF)
(explaining the origins of magistrate judges).
32. See id. at 9 (contrasting “U.S. Commissioners” with “park
commissioners”). Congress better explained park commissioner duties
compared to U.S. Commissioners. See id. (stating that park commissioners
were able to “hear and determine petty offenses on designated federal
territories, national parks, and roads”).
33. See United States v. Maresca, 266 F. 713, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1920)
(limiting commissioner authority to “arresting, imprisoning or bailing
offenders against laws of the United States” (internal quotations omitted)).
34. See Charles A. Lindquist, The Origin and Development of the United
States Commissioner System, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 1–2 (1970) (describing
the four major functions of U.S. Commissioners).
35. See Andrew Chesley, Note, The Scope of United States Magistrate
Judge Authority After Stern v. Marshall, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 757, 761 (2016)
(discussing several reasons why Congress enacted the Federal Magistrates Act
of 1968).
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legal training.36 As a result, the Judicial Conference of the
United States asked the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts to
draft new legislation.37 This legislation overhauled the
qualifications and jurisdictional reach of these new federal
magistrates and replaced the commissioner system.38
B.

Jurisdictional Expansion

The Federal Magistrate Judge Act of 1968 required
magistrate judges to be “a member in good standing of the bar
of the highest court of a State for five years.”39 Aside from
codifying these formal qualifications, Congress expanded
magistrate judge jurisdictional authority by authorizing them
to try and enter final judgment in minor criminal offenses.40
Congress also gave district courts room to expand the use of
magistrate judges, allowing magistrates to conduct other
“additional duties” as determined by the district courts.41 A few
years
later,
Congress
formalized
magistrate
judge
compensation, setting their pay at 75 percent of a district
36. See Hearings on U.S. Commissioner System Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in the Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong. 15–18 (1965) (statement of F. Archie Meatyard Jr., U.S. Comm’r,
Bethesda, MD) (justifying Congress changing the qualifications, salary, and
role of commissioners).
37. See MCCABE, supra note 31, at 9–10 (describing the events prompting
the drafting of the new legislation). The Judicial Conference is the “federal
judiciary’s policymaking body.” Id. at 9.
38. See Federal Magistrate Judge Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat.
1107, 1108 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)) (providing the new law
as drafted by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(1).
40. While many district courts permitted commissioners to conduct petty
offense trials, there was no statutory authorization for this, resulting in only
70 percent of commissioners exercising this power. Lindquist, supra note 34,
at 2.
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (listing the jurisdiction and powers given to
magistrate judges); Peter G. McCabe, The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16
HARV. J. LEGIS. 343, 349 (1979) (discussing three basic duties of federal
magistrate judges under the 1968 Act). These categories are: (1) all the
previous power of U.S. Commissioners; (2) the “trial and disposition of minor
criminal offenses”; and (3) “additional duties” to assist district judges. Id. In
the third category was “preliminary review of prisoner habeas corpus
petitions.” Id.
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judge.42 In 1988, Congress, feeling generous, increased
magistrate and bankruptcy judges’ salary to 92 percent of the
salary of a district judge.43
From the beginning, the jurisdictional scope of magistrate
judge authority was challenged. One question involving habeas
corpus that was resolved by the Supreme Court was whether
magistrate judges could preside over evidentiary hearings in
habeas cases.44 The Court held this power was beyond the scope
of magistrate judge authority.45 Congress, in response, gave
magistrate judges that power in 1976.46
In 1979, Congress once again increased magistrate judge
jurisdiction.47 The 1979 Act added what has become known as
“consent jurisdiction” to Title 28.48 Section 636(c) enables
magistrate judges to, “upon consent of the parties, . . . conduct
any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order
the entry of judgment in the case . . . .”49 If the parties consent,
the only check by the district court is, in extraordinary
circumstances, for good cause, or on the judge’s own motion, to
vacate the reference order to the magistrate judge.50 Once a
magistrate judge enters final judgment under § 636(c), a litigant

42. See McCabe, supra note 31, at 12 (discussing the failure of the 1968
Act to fix magistrate judge compensation).
43. See Judiciary Appropriations Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 408,
101 Stat. 1329-26, 27 (Dec. 22, 1987) (finalizing the salary change).
44. See Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 472 (1974) (deciding the issue
based on the Court’s interpretation of the “additional duties provision” of the
Act), superseded by statute, Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat.
2729 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)).
45. See id. at 472–73 (“Magistrates are prohibited only from conducting
the actual evidentiary hearing.”).
46. See Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)) (authorizing magistrate judges to conduct “all
evidentiary hearings”).
47. Federal Magistrates Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)).
48. Id.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
50. See id. § 636(c)(4) (codifying the district court’s “control” mechanisms
to check magistrate judge power).
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must take any appeal directly to the court of appeals.51 Since the
1979 Act, Congress has not statutorily changed the
jurisdictional scope of magistrate judges.
Over time, however, courts have expanded the power of
magistrate judges. For example, the Supreme Court increased
magistrate judge involvement in criminal cases in Peretz v.
United States.52 In Peretz, the Court confronted the issue of
whether a magistrate judge may conduct jury selection in a
felony case with a defendant’s consent.53 The Court said the
practice is constitutional because the district court retained
supervision over the entire process.54 The rationale was that
“[t]he decision whether to empanel the jury whose selection a
magistrate has supervised . . . remains entirely with the district
court.”55
Similarly, in United States v. Raddatz,56 Justice Blackmun
and a majority of the Court permitted a magistrate judge to
preside over a suppression hearing in a felony trial and issue a
report and recommendation to the district judge on the issue. 57
51. See id. § 636(c)(3) (instructing parties to file appeal within the
parameters set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); FED. R. CIV. P.
73(c) (stating the time and terms to file an appeal).
52. 501 U.S. 923 (1991).
53. See id. at 924–25 (analyzing the matter under the “additional duties”
provision of the United States Code). This provision states: “A magistrate
judge may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3).
54. See Peretz, 501 U.S. at 937 (noting that separation of powers was not
at issue because of this supervision by the district court). The Court later
expanded the holding of Peretz to allow a defendant’s counsel to provide
consent for a magistrate judge to conduct voir dire. See Gonzalez v. United
States, 553 U.S. 242, 253 (2008) (“[A] magistrate judge may preside over jury
examination and jury selection only if the parties, or the attorneys for the
parties, consent. Consent from an attorney will suffice.” (emphasis added)).
55. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 937 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Court said, “[b]ecause the entire process takes place under the district
court’s total control and jurisdiction, there is no danger that use of the
magistrate involves a constitutional attempt to transfer jurisdiction to
non-Article III tribunals for the purpose of emasculating constitutional
courts.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
56. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
57. See id. at 680–81 (“We conclude that the due process rights claimed
here are adequately protected . . . .”). Magistrate judges may issue Reports
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Justice Blackmun stressed that because the district court
supervised the entire process and ultimately made the final
determination whether to adopt the recommendation, no
constitutional concerns were present.58 As will be discussed
later, the Court has been willing to expand magistrate judge
involvement only where there is direct supervision and
reviewability by the district court.
C.

Assignment of Cases to Magistrate Judges

The expansion by Congress and the Supreme Court of
magistrate judge jurisdiction has led district courts to change
the way magistrate judges receive their assignments.59
Magistrate judges disposed of 17,112 civil cases under § 636(c)
jurisdiction from September 2017–September 2018.60 One small
but important factor that determines how much power a
magistrate judge has is how the district courts assign them
cases.
The assignment of cases, where consent jurisdiction is
possible, varies widely.61 Previously, most district courts used
and Recommendations (R&Rs) on any evidentiary issue. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B) (stating that magistrate judges must “submit to a judge of the
court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition”).
58. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 687 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
[T]he handling of suppression motions invariably remains
completely in the control of the federal district court. The judge may
initially decline to refer any matter to a magistrate. When a matter
is referred, the judge may freely reject the magistrate’s
recommendation. He may rehear the evidence in whole or in part.
He may call for additional findings or otherwise “recommit the
matter to the magistrate with instructions.” (citation omitted).
59. See MCCABE, supra note 31, at 24 (referencing a 1983 General
Accounting Office report encouraging district courts to use magistrate judges
more).
60. THE FEDERAL BENCH—ANNUAL REPORT, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS.
(2018), perma.cc/7W9S-SF2B (PDF).
61. See MCCABE, supra note 31, at 44 (discussing the method of
assignment of civil cases); 18 BRUCE A. CARROLL, THE ROLE, DESIGN, AND
GROWING IMPORTANCE OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGES 42–46 (Edwin
Mellen Press ed., 2004) (categorizing the ways district courts assign cases to
magistrate judges). Carroll breaks the categories down into the random
method, rotating method, a paired system, a chief magistrate system, a district
judge system, and other miscellaneous methods. Id. at 42.
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some type of pairing system to assign cases to magistrate
judges.62 This randomly pairs a magistrate judge and district
judge together for a particular case.63 A variation of that system
pairs magistrate judges with a particular district judge for a
definite time period—say six months.64 Both systems allow
magistrate judges to directly handle pre-trial matters and any
matters the district judge refers to them.65
In contrast, the system now used in many district courts,
adds magistrate judges to the random assignment
system—directly assigning them civil cases.66 If the parties do
not consent to the magistrate judge,67 a district judge is
reassigned.68 This direct assignment of § 2255 motions to
magistrate judges continues in many district courts,69 despite
the Magistrate Judge Committee suggesting it is not
appropriate to directly assign § 2255 motions to magistrate
judges.70
62. See MCCABE, supra note 31, at 44 (describing the two types of pairing
systems).
63. Id.
64. See id. (noting that district courts assign cases to both a district judge
and her paired magistrate).
65. See id. (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of the system).
66. See id. (“The Magistrate Judge is the presiding judge on a case and
handles all case management and pretrial proceedings.”); CARROLL, supra note
61, at 42 (stating that a case is reallocated once it goes beyond the magistrate
judge’s jurisdiction).
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (permitting a magistrate judge to “conduct
all proceedings” related to a civil case once the parties consent).
68. See MCCABE, supra note 31, at 44 (noting that this direct assignment
system has been successful in “expediting the disposition of cases”). For better
or worse, more parties now consent to magistrate judge disposition under this
system. See id. (attributing this increase to litigants’ desire for a more
expedited trial schedule).
69. See, e.g., Williams v. Spaulding, No. 18-cv-11554, 2019 WL 2107275,
at *6 (D. Mass. May 14, 2019) (magistrate judge directly assigned);
Rivera-Rivera v. United States, No. Cr. 08-0204, 2015 WL 3965962, at *4
(D.P.R. June 30, 2015) (same).
70. See COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE SYS. OF THE JUD.
CONF., SUGGESTIONS FOR UTILIZATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES 8 (2013)
(emphasizing the precarious position of magistrate judges when required to
enter final judgment on § 2255 motions). The Committee said magistrate
judges should submit reports and recommendations on § 2255 motions. Id.
This is discussed in more detail, infra Part V.B.
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Direct assignment has had the effect of magistrate judges
adjudicating cases, including § 2255 motions, at a higher rate
than the paired system.71 This is because most parties will
consent to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction. Under the paired
system, a district judge would have to refer the case to a
magistrate, who would then obtain the parties’ consent. That
extra hurdle kept § 2255 motions in front of a district judge
more than direct assignment.
D.

Habeas Corpus and the History of § 2255

“The Framers viewed freedom from unlawful restraint as a
fundamental precept of liberty, and they understood the writ of
habeas corpus as a vital instrument to secure that freedom.”72
While on the minds of the Framers during the founding of the
Republic,73 the writ of habeas corpus traces its origins to
England where it was used to enforce Magna Carta.74
Originally, English citizens were unable to use the writ as a way
to secure their rights—rather, the Monarchy used it to control
lords and barons who enforced the law.75 Slowly courts began

71. Compare ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 2019 STATISTICAL TABLES FOR
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, tbl.M-5 (showing 17,817 civil cases terminated under
§ 636(c) jurisdiction), and ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 2018 STATISTICAL
TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, tbl.M-5 (revealing 17,113 civil cases
terminated under § 636(c) jurisdiction), with ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS.,
2010 STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, tbl.M-5 (reporting only
12,470 civil cases terminated by magistrate judges under § 636(c) jurisdiction).
72. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008).
73. Id.; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The establishment of the writ of habeas corpus . . . [is]
perhaps [a] greater securit[y] to liberty and republicanism than any it [the
Constitution] contains.”).
74. See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 112 (1926) (noting
how habeas corpus eventually became a way to enforce Magna Carta’s promise
and prevent false imprisonment); see also MAGNA CARTA cl. 39, reprinted in
J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 461 (2d ed. 1992) (“No free man shall be taken or
imprisoned . . . except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land.”).
75. See Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause:
English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV.
575, 585 (2008) (explaining that kings and queens used the writ as a check on
the power of lords and barons).
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issuing writs to seek information about the legality of a prison
to hold one of the king or queen’s subjects.76
By the early seventeenth century, chaos erupted in England
when The House of Commons passed a statute condemning
“imprison[ment] without any cause.”77 King Charles I, in
response, defied the statute and dissolved Parliament.78 When
Parliament reconvened, they passed The Act of 1640 which
“expressly authorized use of the writ to test the legality of
commitment by command or warrant of the King or the Privy
Council.”79 After more unrest, Parliament reaffirmed its
commitment to liberty and passed the Habeas Corpus Act of
1679 which established a procedural scheme for issuing writs of
habeas corpus and vested the courts with the power to grant
those writs.80 Parliament was clear that the 1679 Act even gave
courts which lacked criminal jurisdiction, like the court of
common pleas, the power to grant writs.81 Ultimately, this
procedural scheme and common law authority became the basis
of early American habeas relief.82
Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution
provides, “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the

76. See 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1341, at 237 (3d ed. 1858) (“[F]or it is said, that the king is entitled,
at all times, to have an account, why the liberty of any of his subjects is
restrained.”).
77. Petition of Right, 3 Car. 1, ch. 1 (1627), reprinted in 5 Statutes of the
Realm 23, 24 (1963).
78. See W. HALL & R. ALBION, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND THE BRITISH
EMPIRE 328 (3d ed. 1953) (detailing the King’s response to the legislation
passed by the House of Commons).
79. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742 (citing The Act of 1640, 16 Car. 1, ch. 10,
reprinted in 5 Statutes of the Realm, at 110).
80. See Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2 (codifying only the
procedural scheme for bringing a habeas petition).
81. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 80–81 (1807) (“Whence
does the court of common pleas derive this power? Not from its criminal
jurisdiction; for it has none. Not from any statute . . . . But from the great
protective principle of the common law . . . .”).
82. See Halliday & White, supra note 75, at 583 (discussing the import of
the statute into the Suspension Clause of the Constitution and state habeas
statutes).
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public Safety may require it.”83 The Suspension Clause is a
unique part of the Constitution because it comes almost
unedited from English law.84 The Framers chose to include only
the limits on suspending the writ in the Constitution—there
was no affirmation of it—because each state already provided
for the right.85 This meant that at the inception of the United
States, habeas corpus proceedings were left to the states to
administer.86
That system did not last long. In the late eighteenth
century, Congress granted federal courts the ability to grant
writs of habeas corpus in the Judiciary Act of 1789. 87 The 1789
Act vested the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to review state
supreme court decisions on habeas petitions.88 As the federal
judiciary grew, Congress gave district courts original
jurisdiction to hear “all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or
of any treaty or law of the United States.”89
More key changes came about in the creation of the modern
habeas statutes in 1948. The Judicial Conference of Senior
Circuit Judges drafted the legislation that created 28 U.S.C.

83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
84. See Halliday & White, supra note 75, at 583 (“Unlike other parts of
the Constitution, in which English practices—for instance, impeachment or
writs of election—were transformed to serve a new constitutional design, the
Suspension Clause carried the writ of habeas corpus out of English practice
and into American law with little additional jurisprudential baggage.”).
85. See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS
CORPUS 128–31 (1980) (“The chief concern . . . was over the power to
suspend.”).
86. See Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 CORNELL
L. REV. 47, 65 (2012) (“In the United States, as in England, the common law
writ continued to operate . . . at the state level . . . .”).
87. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (providing
courts with the statutory authorization to adjudicate habeas corpus petitions);
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 95 (describing the right as a “great
constitutional privilege” supporting federal court jurisdiction).
88. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. at 85–87 (permitting review
under writ-of-error when the decision of the state supreme court is “repugnant
to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States”).
89. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 211 (1952).
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§ 2255.90 Section 2255 was created to provide federal prisoners
relief as broad as habeas corpus.91 Today, § 2255 motions are a
form of post-conviction relief because jurisdiction for these
motions lies in the court that sentenced the movant, rather than
in their district of confinement.92
Until 1976, courts applied the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to § 2255 motions.93 Then, the Supreme Court
requested the promulgation of the Rules Governing Section 2255
Proceedings in the United States District Courts.94 In drafting
these rules, the advisory committee chose a mixture of civil and
criminal rules to govern the proceedings.95 Justifying this
mixture, the advisory committee noted that while a § 2255
motion appears to be a civil proceeding, it is simply a step in the
movant’s criminal proceeding.96 This explanation has sparked
much debate over the proper classification of § 2255 motions.97

90. See Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 206, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838–39
(establishing the Conference); see also 28 U.S.C. § 331 (describing the
Conference as one who examines the condition of business in the federal courts
and recommends legislation to Congress).
91. See Brendan W. Randall, United States v. Cooper: The Writ of Error
Coram Nobis and the Morgan Footnote Paradox, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1063,
1074–75 (1990) (discussing the legislative history of § 2255); Judicial
Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus Procedure to Chairmen of House and
Senate Judiciary Committees, 79th Cong. (1945) (statement of Chief Justice
Stone) (“As a remedy, [§ 2255] is intended to be as broad as habeas corpus.”).
92. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2255, 62 Stat. 869, 967 (codified
as amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255) (“[M]ay move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” (emphasis added)).
93. See, e.g., Helfin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 n.7 (1959)
(applying the civil time to appeal to a § 2255 motion).
94. See Rules Governing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Cases and § 2255 Proceedings,
425 U.S. 1167, 1169, 1181–87 (1976) (describing the purpose of the rules and
the scope of the advisory committee’s work). Congress later approved the
promulgated rules with only minor changes. See Act of Sept. 28, 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-426, §§ 1, 2, 90 Stat. 1334, 1334–35 (1976) (codified as amended 28
U.S.C. foll. § 2255).
95. See Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States
District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2255 (providing the district courts with
guidance on matters such as when to conduct hearings and what burden of
proof applies).
96. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
97. See infra Part III.A.
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III. Magistrate Judge Statutory Authority Over § 2255
Motions
As discussed, consent jurisdiction permits magistrate
judges to enter final judgment only in civil matters.98 This raises
the question whether § 2255 motions are civil matters under
§ 636(c) consent jurisdiction. The courts of appeals are split on
this issue.99 To resolve the issue, courts must consider (1)
whether § 2255 motions are civil, criminal, or hybrid
proceedings, and (2) which of these three classifications fall
within the term “civil matter?”
A.

Circuit Split on Statutory Authority

In Brown v. United States,100 the Eleventh Circuit
considered whether § 636(c) statutorily permits magistrate
judges to adjudicate § 2255 motions.101 Brown was found guilty
of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), which makes it a crime to
persuade an individual under the age of eighteen to engage in
sexual activity.102 He was found to be a career offender under
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and was sentenced to 235
months in prison.103 Brown later filed a § 2255 motion arguing,
among other things, that the district court’s determination that
he was a career offender was incorrect.104 Brown and the
98. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (“[A] United States magistrate judge . . . may
conduct any and all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the
entry of judgment in the case . . . .” (emphasis added)).
99. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
100. 748 F.3d 1045 (2014).
101. See id. at 1047 (deciding the issue on statutory grounds despite the
appeal objecting to the constitutionality of the practice).
102. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).
103. Brown, 748 F.3d at 1048; see U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 4B.1.1(a) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2020) (defining “career offender” as one who
(1) was at least eighteen years old when he committed the instant offense; (2)
that offense is a felony crime of violence or controlled substance offense; and
(3) the defendant has two prior felony convictions for violence or controlled
substance offenses).
104. See Brown, 748 F.3d at 1048 n.5 (“Brown claimed that he was
wrongfully sentenced as a career offender because his conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 2422(b) was not a crime of violence in light of intervening Supreme
Court and Eleventh Circuit case law . . . .”).
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Government consented to a magistrate judge adjudicating the
motion.105 Once Brown consented, and without an evidentiary
hearing, the magistrate judge denied his motion. 106
The Eleventh Circuit granted review and first addressed
whether § 2255 motions fall under § 636(c) jurisdiction.107 After
a thorough examination of the legislative history, the court said
there was no “indication in the legislative history of the 1979
Act that Congress intended that § 636(c) reach habeas corpus or
§ 2255 proceedings—or even that it considered that such a
situation might occur.”108
The Government offered the syllogism that because habeas
corpus statutes, like § 2254 are civil, and because § 2254 and
§ 2255 are analogous proceedings, it follows that § 2255 is a civil
proceeding.109 The court disagreed. It found that § 2255 is not
analogous to habeas relief.110 While magistrate judges can enter
final judgment in § 2254 matters under § 636(c),111 § 2255
proceedings are a “distinct procedural avenue,” and do not share
the same substantive characteristics as other habeas

105. Id. at 1048.
106. See id. (concluding that the motion failed to state a basis for granting
relief). Brown’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied by the
magistrate judge. Id.
107. See id. at 1050–55 (considering the statutory issue to avoid the
constitutional questions presented). The court decided the issue on statutory
grounds to comply with “[p]rinciples of constitutional avoidance.” Id. at 1072.
This counsels courts to “consider the necessary consequences of its choice. If
one of them would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other
should prevail.” Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–81 (2005).
108. Brown, 748 F.3d at 1056.
109. See id. at 1060 (arguing that the similarities between the proceedings
compel the court to find § 2255 motions are civil proceedings and thus a “civil
matter” under § 636(c)).
110. See id. at 1059–60 (“[A] § 2255 motion ‘is not a habeas corpus
proceeding . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Hayman, 324 U.S. 205, 220
(1952))).
111. Id. at 1060–61; see, e.g., Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516, 1522
(11th Cir. 1987) (authorizing magistrate judge disposition of § 2254 motions
under § 636(c) jurisdiction); Farmer v. Litscher, 303 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir.
2020) (same).
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statutes.112 These differences mean § 2255 motions cannot be
civil proceedings just because their origins trace back to habeas
relief.113
The court justified this interpretation by citing the advisory
committee note to the Rules Governing Section 2255
Proceedings which classifies § 2255 motions as criminal.114 The
advisory committee based its determination on the legislative
history of the 1948 statute, which first created § 2255.115 The
advisory committee said that because of the remedies available
under § 2255,116 a magistrate judge would be able to directly
resentence or order the release of a movant convicted of a
felony.117 Those remedies are not civil and fall outside the civil
matters scope of § 636(c).118 Section 2254, on the other hand, has
a more indirectly administered remedy, requiring a federal
judge to issue an order directing the state court to release or
modify the movant’s sentence.119 Thus, the federal court cannot

112. See Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1061 (2014) (noting that
while these statutes are procedurally similar in application, the relief given is
much different).
113. See id. (“[W]e must canvas the history of § 2255 to divine its true
nature.”).
114. See id. at 1062–63 (relying on the statement that § 2255 motions are
another step in a movant’s criminal proceedings).
115. See S. REP. NO. 80-1256, at 2 (1948) (“Since the motion remedy is in
the criminal proceeding, [§ 2255] affords the opportunity and expressly gives
the broad powers to set aside the judgment and to discharge the prisoner or
resentence him or grant a new trial . . . .” (emphasis added) (internal quotation
and citation omitted)).
116. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (permitting the reviewing judge to “vacate, set
aside or correct the sentence”).
117. See Brown, 748 F.3d at 1064 (“[T]he § 2255 proceeding does not
conclude until the relief ordered has been completed.” (citing United States v.
Futch, 518 F.3d 887, 894 (11th Cir. 2008))).
118. See United States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652, 665 (4th Cir. 2007)
(“Thus, although the proceeding [§ 2255] is technically civil in nature, the
remedy entered pursuant to the proceeding is often technically criminal in
nature, as it relates directly to the prisoner’s criminal punishment.” (internal
citations omitted)).
119. See, e.g., Williams v. Jones, No. 03-cv-201, 2010 WL 3834580, at *1
(E.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2010) (granting the movant’s § 2254 motion and ordering
the State of Oklahoma to release petitioner from custody).
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order relief directly.120 This meant under § 2255, magistrate
judges are directly involved in felony sentencing, another
jurisdictional and constitutional issue in and of itself.121
For these reasons, the Brown court found that § 2255
proceedings are not civil matters for purposes of consent
jurisdiction.122 But the court was clear that there was no definite
answer on whether § 2255 is a criminal or civil proceeding.123
That it could be both, bolsters the argument to exclude it from
§ 636(c) jurisdiction.124 One might argue that finding statutory
jurisdiction lacking was only a way for the court to avoid the
constitutional separation of powers concern addressed later in
the opinion.125 Either way, the court was clear—magistrate
judge’s cannot statutorily adjudicate § 2255 proceedings under
§ 636(c).126
In United States v. Johnston,127 the Fifth Circuit reached
the opposite conclusion, despite holding magistrate judge
adjudication of § 2255 motions violates constitutional
separation of powers.128 In determining whether § 2255 motions
are civil matters, the court said that § 2255 is “generally
construed” as being civil.129 Still, the court recognized that
120. See id. (requiring the state court to issue an order releasing the
movant).
121. See Brown, 748 F.3d at 1067 (“[A]llowing a magistrate judge to enter
final judgment on a § 2255 motion would upset a federal criminal conviction,
and Congress has never authorized magistrate judges . . . to try federal felony
offenses.”).
122. See id. at 1068 (“[W]e hold that a § 2255 proceeding is not a civil
matter so as to avoid Article III concerns.”).
123. See id. (“Whether § 2255 is a ‘civil proceeding’ that a magistrate judge
can decide is ambiguous.”).
124. See id. (noting that only entirely civil proceedings should fall under
§ 636(c) jurisdiction).
125. See id. (invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoidance as one
reason for its holding).
126. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
127. 258 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2001).
128. See id. at 366 (“[A] § 2255 proceeding is a civil matter over which
Congress intended magistrate judges to exercise jurisdiction upon consent of
the parties.”); see also infra Part IV.C, for a more in-depth discussion of the
facts of United States v. Johnston and the court’s constitutional analysis.
129. See id. at 365 (referring to § 2255’s relationship to other habeas
relief).
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§ 2255 is distinct from traditional habeas corpus and does have
qualities of a criminal proceeding.130 But the opinion
emphasized that courts should not place “undue importance” on
the advisory committee’s note that § 2255 motions are a step in
the movant’s criminal proceeding.131 After reviewing the text
and legislative history of § 636(c), the court held that § 2255
proceedings are civil matters capable of magistrate judge
disposition.132
B.

Resolving the Split

A two-step analysis can determine whether magistrate
judges may adjudicate § 2555 motions under § 636(c). First, are
§ 2255 motions criminal, civil, or hybrid proceedings?133 Second,
which of those classifications did Congress intend to be a “civil
matter” under § 636(c)?134
1.

Classification of § 2255 Motions

Several arguments support § 2255 motions being classified
as civil proceedings. First, § 2255 is in Title 28 of the United
States Code, which applies to civil proceedings, unlike Title 18
which applies to criminal proceedings.135 Second, as the
Supreme Court stated, because § 2255 is analogous to § 2254,
and § 2254 proceedings are civil, § 2255 proceedings must also
130. See id. (“On the other hand, we have at times suggested that § 2255
motions are conceptually distinguishable from habeas proceedings . . . .”).
131. See id. at 365–66 (noting that classifying § 2255 motions “remains
highly dependent on the proceedings’ context” (internal quotations and
citations omitted)); infra note 147 and accompanying text.
132. See Johnston, 258 F.3d at 366 (“In light of that statutory framework
and legislative intent, we hold that for purposes of § 636(c), a § 2255
proceeding is a civil matter over which Congress intended magistrate judges
to exercise jurisdiction upon consent of the parties.”).
133. See infra Part III.B.1.
134. See infra Part III.B.2.
135. See Robbins, supra note 12, at V.A.3 (arguing that because § 2255 is
in Title 28, Congress intended it to be civil). This argument fails because the
Office of the Law Revision Counsel (OLRC), not Congress, classifies every
public law and “determine[s] where it should go into the Code.” See About
Classification of Laws to the United States Code, OFF. OF THE L. REVISION
COUNS., perma.cc/8U3D-DN2J.
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be civil.136 Third, as a historical matter, since § 2255 is a form of
habeas relief—tracing its roots to England—and the power to
grant habeas writs originated in courts that only exercised civil
jurisdiction, § 2255 motions must be civil proceedings.137
Fourth, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), which governs
appeals in civil cases138 is the appellate rule used in § 2255
proceedings.139
Taken together, however, these characteristics only confirm
§ 2255 motions are procedurally civil.140 None of these
characteristics look at the substance of the rights being
adjudicated. This means § 2255 can still be substantively
criminal, despite being procedurally civil.
Courts have focused on these procedural aspects in
classifying § 2255 motions as independent civil proceedings.141
In Baker v. United States,142 the Eighth Circuit determined that
a § 2255 motion attacks a criminal conviction but is not a
continuation of it.143 The court said a § 2255 motion was “a
136. See Williams v. United States, 984 F.2d 28, 29 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding
§ 2255 is a civil proceeding); Robbins, supra note 12, at V.A.3 (analyzing
whether § 2255 motions are civil or criminal). But see supra note 135 and
accompanying text.
137. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 80–81 (1807) (noting that
when the writ was established in England, courts lacking criminal jurisdiction
had power to issue the writ).
138. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (“In a civil case . . . notice of
appeal . . . must be filed . . . within 30 days after entry of judgment or order
appealed from.”).
139. See Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States
District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2255, Rule 11 (stating the applicable rule
governing the time to file an appeal); Williams, 984 F.2d at 29 (applying rule
4(a) to a § 2255 motion).
140. See supra notes 135–139 and accompanying text.
141. See Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 n.7 (1959) (“For a
motion under § 2255, like a petition for a writ of habeas corpus . . . is not a
proceeding in the original criminal prosecution but an independent civil
suit.”). The Court made this classification, however, before the advisory
committee notes to the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings stated
§ 2255 was part of the movant’s criminal proceeding. See 8 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 622 (4th ed. 2013) (noting
criticism over the civil classification of § 2255).
142. 334 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1964).
143. See id. at 447 (holding that because a § 2255 motion is a civil
proceeding the movant had no right to court-appointed counsel).
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special civil rather than a criminal proceeding.”144 Likewise, the
Third Circuit concluded that a motion to vacate sentence under
§ 2255 is “not a proceeding in the original criminal prosecution
but an independent civil suit.” 145 Despite recognizing the
criminal aspects of § 2255, the Seventh Circuit explained that a
§ 2255 motion “is a step in a criminal proceeding yet is, at the
same time, civil in nature and subject to the civil rules of
procedure.”146
By contrast, the advisory committee who drafted the Rules
Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, said § 2255 motions are “a
further step in a movant’s criminal case and not a separate civil
action.”147 The committee believed Congress explicitly left out a
filing fee in § 2255 “to recognize . . . the nature of a § 2255
motion as being a continuation of the criminal case.” 148 The
Senate Report supplementing the Bill that enacted § 2255
supports the advisory committee’s statements. The report noted
that a motion brought under § 2255 is a “criminal proceeding”
because the remedy afforded is criminal.149
Indeed, the remedies under § 2255 differ from those
available under traditional habeas relief. 150 Unlike § 2254,
§ 2255 remedies are broader in scope and are more directly

144. Id. at 447.
145. Jenkins v. United States, 325 F.2d 942, 944 (3d Cir. 1963).
146. United States v. Balistrieri, 606 F.2d 216, 221 (7th Cir. 1979)
(concluding that § 2255 is an independent civil proceeding).
147. See Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States
District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2255, Rule 11 advisory committee’s note
(explaining the differences between § 2255 and traditional habeas relief).
148. See id. at Rule 3 n.1 (“This is a change from the practice of charging
$15 and is done to recognize specifically the nature of a § 2255 motion as being
a continuation of the criminal case . . . .”).
149. See S. REP. NO. 96-74, at 1–3 (1948) (differentiating between the
procedural and substantive aspects of § 2255).
150. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (permitting the judge to directly order the
appropriate relief), with 17B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 4268.4 (3d ed. 2007)
Grant of a writ of habeas corpus [under § 2254] need not result in
the unconditional release of the prisoner. It may do so, but much
more commonly the prisoner will be ordered discharged unless the
prisoner is retried within a reasonable time which may be specified
in the order.
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administered by the reviewing judge.151 This is because, under
§ 2254, a federal judge may only order the state court to release
the movant—the federal judge cannot directly order his
release.152 Under § 2255, however, the reviewing judge may
order the relief directly and release the movant or resentence
him.153 Thus, because the remedy in a § 2254 motion is only a
civil order,154 it is more like a civil proceeding. Section 2255, by
contrast, must be different since the district judge administers
the remedy directly by amending the original sentencing
order.155
Some courts have said this remedial scheme proves that
§ 2255 motions are criminal proceedings. For example, the
Second Circuit held that a § 2255 motion is not an independent
civil proceeding.156 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit classifies § 2255
proceedings as criminal.157 In United States v. Cook,158 the
Tenth Circuit noted that while a § 2255 motion has the
“characteristics of a writ of habeas corpus,” 159 it is not a habeas
proceeding, but is merely a “continuation of the original
criminal action.”160
151. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (authorizing the reviewing judge to vacate and
resentence the movant).
152. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 150, § 4268.4 (stating the federal court
is limited to ordering the state court to act); supra note 119 and accompanying
text.
153. See 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 635 (4th ed. 1995) (noting that not only may the judge resentence
the movant based on the success of a § 2255 motion, she may also resentence
the movant on “other counts that were not challenged by the motion”).
154. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (permitting a district court to remand a case
for want of jurisdiction which orders the state court to take back jurisdiction).
155. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
156. See Williams v. United States, 984 F.2d 28, 29 (2d Cir. 1993)
(concluding that because § 2255 is not civil, the procedure set out in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 58 for entry of judgment does not apply). Rule 58 sets
out the procedure for entry of judgment by district courts in civil proceedings.
FED. R. CIV. P. 58.
157. See United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1047 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000)
(emphasizing “it is now clear” that § 2255 motions are a further step in the
movant’s criminal proceeding).
158. 997 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1993).
159. Id. at 1316 n.3.
160. Id. at 1315 n.1.
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In short, § 2255 includes remedies comparable to the
sentencing phase of a criminal case while proceeding through
the courts like a civil proceeding.161 A proper resolution, then, is
to classify § 2255 motions as hybrid proceedings that are both
civil and criminal. In United States v. Means,162 the Sixth
Circuit did just that.163 The court made no categorical
classification of § 2255 motions because aspects of the
proceeding point to it being both civil and criminal.164 The court
acknowledged the civil procedural posture and criminal
remedies the statute affords.165 Even though this hybrid
classification is doctrinally opaque, it is the proper classification
of a proceeding that courts so often disagree about.166 Thus, the
answer to the first question is that § 2255 motions are hybrid
proceedings with criminal and civil characteristics.
2.

Definition of “Civil Matter” Under § 636(c)

The hybrid nature of § 2255 makes determining whether
the proceeding is a civil matter harder. This is because Congress
did not define the term “civil matter” in § 636(c).167 The scope of
the term has instead been left to the courts to decide.168 When

161. Cf. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293–94 (1969) (“It is, of course,
true that habeas corpus proceedings are characterized as ‘civil.’ But the label
is gross and inexact. Essentially, the proceeding is unique.” (citations
omitted)).
162. 133 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 1998).
163. See id. at 448–49 (“The inescapable fact is that [§ 2255] has
characteristics of both [civil and criminal matters], and may properly be
categorized as one or the other depending on the context and the reason for
making the inquiry.” (citations omitted)).
164. See id. at 448–49 (citing United States v. Nahodil, 36 F.3d 323, 328
(3d Cir. 1994)) (discussing the countervailing classifications of § 2255
motions).
165. See id. at 449 (differentiating between the procedural and substantive
aspects).
166. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
167. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (failing to define the term “civil matter” in
the statute’s text or accompaniments).
168. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1068 (11th Cir. 2014)
(determining whether a § 2255 proceeding is a civil matter).
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interpreting a word in a statute, courts generally look to the
statute’s plain text and then to the legislative history.169
At the time of drafting, Black’s Law Dictionary defined
“civil” as “[r]elating to private rights and remedies sought by
civil actions as contrasted with criminal proceedings.” 170 This
indicates Congress chose to limit “civil matter” to cases relating
to private rights and remedies.171 Here, motions under § 2255
are not between private parties172 and do not provide private
remedies.173 The statutory interpretation cannon expressio
unius est exclusion alterius, or “the expression of one thing
excludes the alternatives,” also cautions that by only including
cases relating to private rights and remedies, Congress
deliberately excluded cases with criminal rights and
remedies.174 Taken together, the statute’s text suggests § 636(c)
169. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:1 (7th ed. 2008) (noting that courts are
bound to the plain meaning of a word in a statute and only when that term is
ambiguous should the intent of the legislators be “gleaned”). Moreover,
“[w]here a statutory provision is clear and unambiguous, and not
unreasonable or illogical in its operation, a court may not go outside the
statute to give it a different meaning.” Id. But where the relevant legislative
history would import a different meaning, courts may consider the legislative
history even when the text is unambiguous. See id. (discussing the limitations
and exceptions to the plain meaning rule).
170. Civil, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
171. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 169, § 47:7 (explaining that when
legislators do not define the words in a statute, courts will give that word its
“common and ordinary meaning”). One way to determine the common meaning
is through a dictionary definition. Id.
172. See, e.g., Brown, 748 F.3d at 1047 (showing Assistant United States
Attorneys representing the Government’s interests).
173. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
174. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 (1991) (“[I]f Congress had
such an intent, Congress would have made it explicit in the statute . . . .”); see
also SINGER & SINGER, supra note 169, § 47:23 (“[W]here a statute designates
a form of conduct, the manner of its performance and operation, and the
persons and things to which it refers, courts should infer that all omissions
were intentional exclusions.”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING
LAW 107 (2012) (explaining uses of the doctrine). But see Barnhart v. Peabody
Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (“[The interpretive doctrine] has force only
when the items expressed are members of an ‘associated group or series’ . . . .”
(citation omitted)). The question then becomes, are civil and criminal cases
“members of an associated group?” It seems odd to say inclusion of civil would
AND
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does not include cases where (1) a private party is adverse to the
Government, and (2) a criminal remedy is available.175 The
statute thus clearly excludes criminal proceedings. But the text
alone is unclear as to whether Congress meant § 636(c) to
include hybrid proceedings that have criminal aspects. Because
§ 2255 motions are hybrid proceedings, courts must look beyond
the text of the statute, to the legislative history, to determine
whether § 2255 motions fall under consent jurisdiction.176
The legislative history of § 636(c) shows Congress did not
intend the statute to include hybrid proceedings like § 2255. In
the House Conference Report, the committee made repeated
reference to “civil actions” and “civil cases.”177 The Senate
Committee likewise said § 636(c) should aid district judges in
attending to “a mounting queue of civil cases.”178 The
justification given for expanding jurisdiction was “[i]f . . . civil
cases are forced out of court as a result, they [litigants] lose all
their procedural safeguards.”179 Thus, the repeated use of the
word “civil” and absence of “criminal” in the legislative history
shows Congress’ intent to limit § 636(c)(1) to purely civil
proceedings.180 This history also never discusses a back log of
criminal cases or prisoner petitions, showing Congress never
even considered criminal proceedings or habeas when enacting
the statute.181
also imply criminal because Congress often separates them. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1251–5001 (statutes applicable only in civil contexts); 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3001–3772 (statutes applicable only in criminal cases).
175. See supra notes 170–174 and accompanying text.
176. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 169, § 45:2 (stating that even the
most carefully drafted statute is subject to multiple interpretations depending
on the facts involved). When there is a genuine uncertainty about the statute’s
meaning, even if a word would ordinarily be unambiguous, court “must
consider the particular problem the legislature was addressing, prior
legislative considerations of the problem, the act’s legislative history,
operation, and administration, and even preexisting common law.” Id.
177. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 96-444, at 1–3 (1979), as reprinted in 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1487, 1487–89 (using the terms synonymously).
178. S. REP. NO. 96-74, at 3 (1979), as reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1469,
1470–72 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 4.
180. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 177–179 and accompanying text.
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Despite this legislative history, courts cite Congress’ goal of
increasing litigant access to federal courts to justify a broad
interpretation of “civil matter,” to include § 2255 motions.182 The
Fifth Circuit said, to give proper effect to Congress’ goals, “civil
matter” should be interpreted in the broadest, rather than
narrowest sense.183 This broad reading provides the increased
access to courts and reduced caseloads—goals Congress set out
to achieve when drafting the statute.184
But this approach reads into the statute proceedings
Congress never considered.185 Prisoner petitions and other
criminal proceedings are never mentioned in the legislative
history and were, by all indications, not even on the minds of
§ 636’s drafters.186 And increasing access to courts for federal
habeas petitioners would not have been on their minds since
courts are the only venue where prisoners can seek such
relief.187
Thus,
Congress’
reason
for
expanding
jurisdiction—litigants
choosing
alternative
dispute
188
resolution— cannot occur in § 2255 proceedings.
In the end, however, a § 2255 proceeding should not be a
“civil matter.” The text of § 636(c)189 and its legislative history190
show that while Congress did intend to increase litigants’ access
182. See, e.g., United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2001)
(interpreting civil matters under § 636(c) broadly to include § 2255 motions).
183. See id. at 366 (advocating for judicial efficiency by expanding the
scope of § 636(c) jurisdiction).
184. See id. (describing Congress’ two goals in enacting § 636(c)).
185. See United States v. Lewis, 991 F.2d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 1999) (“This
rationale reads too much into what was not said by the legislative
history . . . .”).
186. See Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1066 (11th Cir. 2014)
(stating that the Senate drafted the bill to encourage litigants to remain in
federal court rather than seeking alternative dispute resolution systems);
supra note 179 and accompanying text.
187. See Brown, 748 F.3d at 1066 (“Of course, federal prisoners seeking
postconviction relief via § 2255 cannot resolve their claims outside the
courthouse.”).
188. Compare Johnston, 258 F.3d at 366 (justifying § 2255 falling under
§ 636(c) because it increases access to federal courts), with Brown, 748 F.3d at
1066 (explaining that § 2255 motions were never in danger of being moved to
alternative dispute resolution).
189. See supra notes 169–174 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 177–187 and accompanying text.
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to federal courts, it did not intend to make the jurisdictional
statute a catch all for § 2255 motions and other criminal
proceedings.191
IV.

Constitutionality of Magistrate Judge Disposition of
§ 2255 Motions

Even if § 2255 motions fall within § 636(c) jurisdiction,
Congress has violated the doctrine of separation of powers by
allowing magistrate judges to adjudicate these proceedings. The
unique posture by which a magistrate judge reviews a decision
made by a district judge implicates broad separation of powers
concerns.192 This Part of the Note will first review Supreme
Court jurisprudence on Article III separation of powers. Then
the Note will discuss how lower courts have dealt with
constitutional challenges to magistrate judges adjudicating
§ 2255 motions. Finally, this Part will determine whether
magistrate judge adjudication of § 2255 motions violates the
doctrine of separation of powers and whether party consent can
cure this violation.
A.

The Supreme Court and Article III Separation of Powers

The Supreme Court began its Article III separation of
powers doctrine by establishing a framework to evaluate the
constitutionality of Congress giving Article III power to a
non-Article III judge.193 This is known as the legislative court

191. See Brown, 748 F.3d at 1066 (“We doubt that by amending § 636 to
allow magistrate judges to enter final judgment in civil matters, Congress also
implicitly amended the habeas corpus chapter of Title 28 to allow magistrate
judges to enter final judgment.”).
192. See id. at 1070
This is so [separation of powers concerns] because a magistrate
judge entertaining such a motion [§ 2255] would create an ironic
situation whereby non-Article III magistrate judges review and
reconsider the propriety of rulings by Article III district judges, but
do not themselves have to worry about review by the district court.
(internal quotation and citation omitted).
193. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
63–64 (1982) (establishing the framework).
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doctrine.194 Justice Brennan enumerated three categories of
cases in which Congress may delegate to non-Article III
adjudicators:195 (1) cases in territories where no state operates
as sovereign, (2) cases adjudicated by military tribunals, and (3)
cases involving public rights.196 Public rights cases are those
“arising ‘between the Government and persons subject to its
authority in connection with the performance of the
constitutional functions of the executive or legislative
departments.’”197 Scholars describe the creation of the
legislative court doctrine as the shift in the Supreme Court from
a formalistic to a more “pragmatic” approach to separation of
powers.198
Ultimately, this tripartite framework was eliminated and
replaced with an even more pragmatic approach in Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.199 The CFTC adopted a
regulation allowing the agency to adjudicate common law
counterclaims that “ar[ose] out of the transaction or occurrence
or series of transactions or occurrences set forth in the
complaint.”200 Schor filed a claim with the CFTC against his
broker, Conti, for violating the Commodity Exchange Act.201
Conti answered, denied the allegation, and counterclaimed for
the debt balance on Schor’s account (a common law claim).202 An
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) heard the case and ruled
against Schor.203 In response, Schor challenged the statutory
194. See Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring up Article III:
Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B. U. L. REV. 85,
91 (1988) (describing the doctrine as an effort “to preserve the integrity of
[A]rticle III while accommodating Congress’s need for flexibility in the exercise
of its enumerated powers”).
195. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 70.
196. Id. at 64–70.
197. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 489 (2011) (quoting Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–51 (1932)).
198. See Saphire & Solimine, supra note 194, at 105 n.149 (describing the
majority’s approach in Northern Pipeline).
199. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
200. Id. at 837.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 838.
203. See id. (dismissing Schor’s claim and granting Conti’s counterclaim
for the debt balance).
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authority of the ALJ over the counterclaim.204 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and
dismissed Conti’s counterclaim, holding that the ALJ’s
adjudication of it violated Article III separation of powers. 205
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.206 Justice O’Connor,
writing for the majority reversed, holding that the ALJ had
statutory and constitutional authority to adjudicate the
common law counterclaim.207 Justice O’Connor rejected the
categorical approach taken by the Court in Northern Pipeline
and instead adopted a balancing test, considering “the degree to
which a grant of judicial power to a non-[A]rticle III court
actually impinged upon [A]rticle III values.”208 This test focused
on the threat adjudication by an non-Article III judge had on
Article III independence and on a litigant’s right to have her
case heard by a judge free from influence by another branch of
government.209 The Court, however, was clear that Article III
“does not confer on litigants an absolute right to the plenary
consideration of every . . . claim by an Article III court.”210
The Court also addressed waiver and consent.211 Justice
O’Connor noted that, like other individual constitutional rights,

204. See id. (arguing that the CFTC’s rule giving the ALJ his authority
was broader than what Congress authorized in the enabling act).
205. See id. at 839 (raising the constitutional issue sua sponte before oral
argument).
206. Id. at 841.
207. See id. at 843 (“[T]he broad grant of power in § 12a(5) clearly
authorizes the promulgation of regulations providing for adjudication of
common law counterclaims arising out of the same transaction as a
reparations complaint because such jurisdiction is necessary, if not critical, to
accomplish the purposes behind the reparations program.”).
208.
Saphire & Solimine, supra note 194, at 121 (synthesizing the test
adopted in Schor); see Schor, 478 U.S. at 848.
209. See id. (“Article III, § 1, serves both to protect the role of the
independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite
government, and to safeguard litigants’ right to have claims decided before
judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of
government.”).
210. Id.
211. See id. (stating that independent and impartial adjudication by an
Article III judge serves as a personal constitutional protection and is subject
to waiver).
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the right to an Article III adjudicator is subject to waiver.212
Here, Schor asked Conti, who originally filed in district court, to
bring its counterclaim before the CFTC.213 This amounted to a
waiver of Schor’s right to have the common law claim proceed
before an Article III judge.214 Even though this waiver mooted
individual constitutional concerns, the Court said litigants
cannot waive structural constitutional violations. 215 This
statement, however, was dicta because the Court concluded this
case presented no structural violation.216
Justice Brennan dissented with Justice Marshall.217 They
said that the ALJ’s jurisdiction was an encroachment on Article
III power.218 The dissent preferred keeping the rule from
Northern Pipeline and limiting non-Article III adjudication to
“[the] exceptions we have recognized for territorial courts,
courts-martial, and administrative courts . . . based on certain
exceptional powers bestowed upon Congress by the
Constitution.”219 Justice Brennan criticized the majority’s
balancing test because it compares functionalist goals, the
benefits of which are immediate, against separation of powers

212. See id. at 848–49 (comparing waiver of an Article III judge to waiver
of a jury trial).
213. See id. at 849–50 (noting that Schor could have proceeded in the
district court).
214. See id. at 850 (reiterating that Schor was the one who asked Conti to
dismiss the district court case in favor of the bankruptcy judge adjudicating
it).
215. See id. at 850–51 (“To the extent that this structural principle
[separation of powers] is implicated in a given case, the parties cannot by
consent cure the constitutional difficulty for the same reason that the parties
by consent cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond
the limitations imposed by Article III, § 2.” (emphasis added)).
216. See id. (concluding the ALJ did not infringe on Article III
independence when he adjudicated Conti’s counterclaim).
217. Id. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
218. See id. at 860 (“The separation of powers and the checks and balances
that the Framers built into our tripartite form of government were intended
to operate as a ‘self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.’” (quoting Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam))).
219. Id. at 861.
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protections, the benefits of which manifest over time.220 Citing
a mid-nineteenth century case, the dissent said, “Congress may
not ‘withdraw from Article III judicial cognizance any matter
which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law,
or in equity, or admiralty.’”221
Nor should consent cure individual or structural
constitutional concerns, the dissent added, because these
“interests served by Article III are coextensive.” 222 Justice
Brennan believed a litigant may “[n]ever waive his right to an
Article III tribunal where one is constitutionally required” and
because structural and individual constitutional concerns are
intertwined, consent to an individual violation cannot be
imputed to a structural violation.223
Schor was the standard until 2011, when the Court decided
Stern v. Marshall.224 There, Chief Justice Roberts moved the
Supreme Court’s legislative court doctrine back to the
formalistic era of Northern Pipeline.225 The Court addressed the
issue of whether Article III permits a bankruptcy court to enter
final judgment on a litigant’s state law counterclaim.226 A
majority held it did not.227 Like Northern Pipeline, the Court
rejected the notion that the exercise of Article III power by a
non-Article III judge does not raise separation of powers

220. See id. at 863 (“[T]he Court pits an interest the benefits of which are
immediate, concrete, and easily understood against one, the benefits of which
are almost entirely prophylactic, and thus often seem remote and not worth
the cost in any single case.”).
221. Id. at 862 (quoting Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855)).
222. Id. at 867.
223. See id. (arguing party consent is irrelevant to separation of powers
analysis).
224. 564 U.S. 462 (2011).
225. See id. at 469 (relying on the tripartite framework from Northern
Pipeline to hold the bankruptcy judge lacked constitutional authority to
adjudicate the state law claim).
226. See id. at 482 (adding that the bankruptcy judge did have statutory
jurisdiction).
227. See id. (“Although we conclude that § 157(b)(2)(C) permits the
Bankruptcy Court to enter final judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim, Article III
of the Constitution does not.”).
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concerns.228 Here, the bankruptcy judge was impermissibly
exercising Article III power when it entered final judgment on
the state law counterclaim.229 This case did not fit into any of
the three Northern Pipeline exceptions which permit
congressional delegation of judicial power.230 The Court stated
that even though district courts appoint and refer cases to
bankruptcy judges, there was a lack of sufficient supervision
and control to cleanse the delegation of its separation of powers
concerns.231
B.

Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif

In 2015, the Supreme Court decided Wellness International
Network, Ltd. v. Sharif.232 In a bankruptcy proceeding,
Wellness, a creditor of Sharif’s, filed a five-count complaint
alleging Sharif unlawfully concealed property.233 Count V of the
complaint sought a declaratory judgment, under state law, that
the assets held in trust were Sharif’s property subject to the
bankruptcy estate.234 The district court denied Sharif’s motion
to file supplemental briefing on whether the bankruptcy court
was constitutionally able to enter final judgment on the state
law claim.235 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held the
bankruptcy court violated separation of powers by adjudicating
the state law claim.236
The Supreme Court took up the issue of whether Article III
permits a bankruptcy judge to adjudicate a state law claim if the

228. See id. at 486 (rejecting the argument that “the bankruptcy judge was
acting merely as an adjunct of the district court” (citing N. Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67–72 (1982))).
229. See id. at 487 (rejecting Vickie Lynn Marshall’s assertion that this
case falls into the “public rights” exception).
230. Id.
231. See id. at 501 (“[I]t does not matter who appointed the bankruptcy
judge or authorized the judge to render final judgments in such proceedings.
The constitutional bar remains.”).
232. 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
233. Id. at 1940.
234. Id. at 1941.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1941–42.
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parties consent to jurisdiction.237 Justice Sotomayor, writing for
the majority, held that no separation of powers violation
occurred because the litigants consented to the bankruptcy
judge’s jurisdiction over the state law claim.238 Relying on Schor,
the Court said that the right to an Article III adjudicator was
partially “a personal right” and thus “subject to waiver.”239 Still,
the Court recognized a structural separation of powers
component that consent cannot cure.240 In the end, however,
Sharif’s consent waived his personal right to have an Article III
judge adjudicate his case241 and that consent reduced structural
separation of powers concerns to a de minimis level.242 This is
the complete opposite of Justice Brennan’s conclusion in Schor
that because structural and individual constitutional concerns
are so interwoven, consent cannot be a factor in whether a
separation of powers violation occurred.243
In making this determination, the majority applied the
Schor factors.244 First, the Court reasoned that because district
237. Id. at 1939. The Court also looked to whether consent must be
express. Id. at 1947. In this part of the opinion, the Court determined implied
consent is enough. See id. at 1948 (“The implied consent standard . . . supplies
the appropriate rule for adjudications by bankruptcy courts . . . .”). A litigant’s
consent must still be knowing and voluntary but is sufficient where “the
litigant or counsel was made aware of the need for consent and the right to
refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to try the case.” Id. (internal quotation
and citation omitted).
238. See id. at 1944–45 (“[W]e conclude that allowing bankruptcy litigants
to waive the right to Article III adjudication of Stern claims does not usurp the
constitutional prerogatives of Article III courts.”).
239. Id. at 1944 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986)).
240. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
241. See Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1945 n.10 (“Consent provides, if not
complete, at least very considerable reason to doubt that the tribunal poses a
serious threat to the ideal of federal adjudicatory independence.” (quoting
Daniel J. Meltzer, Legislative Courts, Legislative Power, and the Constitution,
65 IND. L.J. 291, 303 (1990))).
242. See id. (reiterating that consent cannot cure a structural violation, if
one occurs, but can act to mitigate the occurrence of a structural violation).
243. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
244. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944
(2015).
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judges appoint and have the ability to remove bankruptcy
judges,245 enough supervision and control exists to cleanse the
delegation of Article III power away from the district court.246
Additionally, the scope of the bankruptcy judge’s jurisdiction
was limited.247 That jurisdiction only extends to “a narrow class
of common law claims as an incident to the bankruptcy courts’
primary, and unchallenged, adjudicative function.”248
The Court did not discuss the second Schor factor, moving
directly to why Congress expanded bankruptcy judge
jurisdiction.249 In analyzing this third factor, the Court noted
that the congressional concerns which drove the legislature to
expand bankruptcy jurisdiction was not “in an effort to
aggrandize itself or humble the Judiciary.”250 Congress’ reason
for expanding bankruptcy judge power was to reduce the burden

The Court must weigh [1] the extent to which the essential
attributes of judicial power are reserved to Article III courts, and,
conversely, the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises
the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article
III courts, [2] the origins and importance of the right to be
adjudicated, and [3] the concerns that drove Congress to depart
from the requirements of Article III. (internal quotation and
citation omitted).
245. See id. at 1945 (describing the mechanisms in place for district court
supervision and review).
246. See id. (“[T]he decision to invoke a non-Article III forum is left entirely
to the parties and the power of the federal judiciary to take jurisdiction
remains in place.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).
247. See id. (noting that the bankruptcy courts possess “no free-floating
authority”).
248. Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
249. See id. (moving directly from the discussion of the district court’s
control to the reasoning behind Congress expanding bankruptcy judge
jurisdiction).
250. See id. (finding no separation of powers danger in allowing
bankruptcy judges to adjudicate Stern claims with the parties’ consent because
the control and power remained vested in the district court).
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on Article III judges. 251 In the end, none of the Schor factors
suggested a separation of powers violation.252
After applying the Schor factors, the Court returned to
consent.253 The majority reiterated that “Northern Pipeline
established only that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III
court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue
binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under
state law, without consent of the litigants . . . .”254 In each case
where the Supreme Court found a violation of a separation of
powers, it involved a party being forced to litigate “involuntarily
before a non-Article III court.”255 Here, because the parties
consented, those same concerns were not present, reducing any
Article III concerns.256
Chief Justice Roberts dissented, explaining that the
majority’s conclusion was improper because it confused
individual
constitutional
safeguards
with
structural
safeguards.257 While a litigant may consent to an Article III
violation that affects her personal right, she cannot “by consent
cure the [structural] constitutional difficulty for the same
reason that the parties by consent cannot confer on federal
courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond the limitations

251. See id. at 1946 (“Congress could choose to rest the full share of the
Judiciary’s labor on the shoulders of Article III judges . . . . Instead, Congress
has supplemented the capacity of district courts through the able assistance
of bankruptcy judges.”).
252. See id. (concluding that, taken together, the factors show the district
court retained its Article III power).
253. See id. at 1946–47 (distinguishing Stern and Northern Pipeline
because in both cases the litigants had not consented to a non-Article III
adjudicator).
254. Id. at 1946 (internal quotation omitted).
255. See id. at 1947 (referencing Northern Pipeline and Stern).
256. See id. at 1944 (“[The] question must be decided not by ‘formalistic
and unbending rules,’ but ‘with an eye to the practical effect that the’ practice
‘will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.’”
(quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587
(1985))).
257. See id. at 1956 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Schor
recognized both a personal right to an Article III judge subject to waiver and
a structural protection to Article III that litigants cannot waive).
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imposed by Article III.”258 The “structural” protections Chief
Justice Roberts discuses are those limitations that “serve
institutional interests”259 —including the protections afforded to
Article III judges by the Constitution.260 Because of these
safeguards, “Congress may not confer power to decide federal
cases and controversies upon judges who do not comply with the
structural safeguards of Article III.”261 Chief Justice Roberts’
view is that litigant consent can never diminish or somehow
avoid structural safeguards.262
C.

Constitutional Concerns Addressed by Lower Courts

While the Supreme Court has not addressed the
constitutional concerns related to consent jurisdiction and
§ 2255 proceedings, various circuit courts have. The Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Bryson263 took up the issue of whether
magistrate judges can adjudicate § 2255 motions in
misdemeanor cases.264 There, the magistrate judge who
adjudicated the § 2255 motion was also the sentencing judge in
Bryson’s case.265 The court held a magistrate judge can enter
final judgment in a § 2255 motion under § 636(c) when they are
the sentencing judge.266 The magistrate judge, however, failed to
obtain consent from Bryson during the § 2255 proceeding and
258. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850–51 (1986)).
259. See id. (discussing the importance of these protections to the
Constitution and comparing them to structural safeguards that pertain to the
legislative and executive branches).
260. See id. (reiterating the constitutional protections afforded to Article
III judges and their importance to a system of separation of powers).
261. Id. at 1951.
262. See id. at 1959 (“But the fact remains that Congress controls the
salary and tenure of bankruptcy judges, and the Legislature’s present
solicitude provides no guarantee of its future restraint.”).
263. 981 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1992).
264. See id. at 723 (“The issue now presented is whether the magistrate
judge’s jurisdiction over the misdemeanor case included the jurisdiction over
the § 2255 motion.”). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3401, magistrate judges may conduct
trials and impose sentences in misdemeanor cases. 18 U.S.C. § 3401.
265. Bryson, 981 F.2d at 721–22.
266. See id. at 724 (“With the explicit consent to do so, a magistrate judge
can decide the § 2255 motion on the merits.”).
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thus the denial of his motion was reversed on appeal.267 The
court said separation of powers concerns were minimal here
because the magistrate judge only reviewed his own sentence.268
This is unlike the situation in the next two cases, where a
magistrate judge reviewed determinations made by district
judges in felony cases.
The Fifth Circuit in Johnston, was first to address
magistrate judge disposition of § 2255 motions where a district
judge presided over the original felony trial.269 There, the
movant alleged that the district court made a procedural error
in relying on certain testimony to determine his sentence.270
Both Johnston and the Government consented to proceed before
a magistrate judge.271 That magistrate denied Johnston’s
motion, which he appealed.272 The Fifth Circuit addressed the
issue of whether “the delegation of the duty to a magistrate
judge offends the principles of Article III.”273
The court began by noting that consent or waiver by the
litigants “does not eliminate the constitutional concerns” linked
to delegating § 2255 proceedings to a magistrate judge.274
Structural concerns protect an independent judiciary and
ensure co-equality among the three branches of government.275
267. See id. (noting that Bryson’s consent was clear for the magistrate to
sentence him, but not for the magistrate to enter final judgment in his § 2255
motion). The court also rejected the Government’s argument that consent in
the initial proceeding could extend to the subsequent § 2255 motion. See id.
(refusing to expand the definition of “sentencing” under 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) to
include § 2255 motions).
268. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
269. See United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 2001)
(raising the issue sua sponte).
270. Id. Johnston also argued his conviction was unconstitutional because
the Government engaged in improper conduct during the trial. Id.
271. Id.
272. See id. (noting that there was confusion about whether Johnston was
filing a notice of appeal or moving for a certificate of appealability).
273. See id. at 366. (“[W]e must still determine whether delegating those
[§ 2255] proceedings to magistrate judges comports with the strictures of
Article III.”).
274. Id. at 366–67.
275. See id. at 367 (distinguishing between the personal right to have an
Article III judge preside over a case and the structural principles designed to
keep Article III power vested in Article III judges).
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These concerns contrast with individual concerns related to
having a case heard by an independent Article III judge.276 The
structural concern implicated here, is a magistrate judge sitting
in a quasi-appellate capacity reviewing a district judge’s prior
determination.277 The court explained that run-of-the-mill civil
cases only require a magistrate to adjudicate issues between the
parties.278 Section 2255 motions, on the other hand, “do[ ] not
easily comport with the average civil case or even another
quasi-civil proceeding” because magistrate judges act more like
an appellate judge evaluating whether a district judge’s
sentence was proper.279
More than just the reviewability issue, other aspects of
magistrate judges adjudicating § 2255 motions troubled the
court. First, magistrate judges need not defer to the district
judge’s prior determinations.280 This allows the supervisee (the
magistrate judge) to effectively supervise the supervisor (the
district judge).281 And recognizing the criminal characteristics of
a § 2255 motion, the court stressed that even if a magistrate
judge could constitutionally review and modify a civil order or
misdemeanor sentence by a district judge, they could never
modify or vacate a sentence imposed in a felony case. 282
Indeed, permitting a magistrate judge to dispose of § 2255
motions “encroaches upon a district court’s exclusive felony trial
domain.”283 This is different than in Peretz, where a magistrate

276. See id. (“[T]he only matter before us is whether the delegation of the
§ 2255 motion pursuant to § 636(c) offended the structural guarantees of
Article III.”).
277. See id. at 368 (discussing the complexities a § 2255 motion presents
compared to a run-of-the-mill civil proceeding).
278. See id. (minimizing the constitutional impact in ordinary civil cases).
279. See id. (referring to magistrate judges reviewing a district judge’s
determination).
280. See id. at 369 (implying that review under § 2255 is de novo).
281. See id. (emphasizing that this scheme moots the argument that
because the district court supervises magistrate judges, the essential
attributes of judicial power remain vested in Article III).
282. See id. (explaining that having a magistrate judge embroiled in a
felony criminal case is alone an Article III violation).
283. Id. at 370.
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judge supervised voir dire in a felony trial.284 There, the
Supreme Court permitted the practice because it was ultimately
left to the district judge’s final determination whether to
empanel the magistrate judge-selected jury.285
The final thing troubling the court was the lack of district
court review and supervision once a magistrate judge enters
final judgment.286 Section 636(c) treats magistrate judges less
as adjuncts under the supervision of Article III judges and more
like they are independent of Article III control.287 This is
because any appeal would go directly to the court of appeals for
that circuit. For these reasons, the court held the practice was
unconstitutional for violating the doctrine of separation of
powers.288
The Brown court likewise addressed these constitutional
concerns, but instead decided that magistrate judges lack
statutory authority to adjudicate § 2255 motions.289 The court
began at the founding, noting the importance an independent
judiciary meant to the survival of the Republic.290 The Framers
built into the Constitution a system of checks and balances that
“defines the power and protects the independence of the Judicial
Branch.”291 The importance of this system is to keep judicial
284. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 937 (1991) (doing so under
the “additional duties” provision of § 636).
285. See id. (holding so because the district court had the final say on
empaneling the magistrate judge’s selected jury).
286. See United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 370 (5th Cir. 2001)
(noting the posture of § 2255 motions turns reviewability on its head).
287. See id. (explaining that unlike a district judge reviewing a magistrate
judge’s determination (like in Peretz), a magistrate judge reviews an Article
III judge’s rulings).
288. See id. at 372 (“[W]e conclude that the consensual delegation of § 2255
motions to magistrate judges violates Article III of the Constitution.”).
289. See Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1068 (11th Cir. 2014)
(“[W]e hold that a § 2255 proceeding is not a civil matter so as to avoid Article
III concerns.”).
290. See id. at 1069 (describing separation of powers as “essential” in
framing the Constitution); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 428 (Alexander
Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (“[Separation of powers ensures an]
independent spirit in the judges, which must be essential to the faithful
performance of so arduous a duty.”).
291. See Brown, 748 F.3d at 1069 (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462,
482–83 (2011)).
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power vested in Article III judges. 292 When magistrate judges
enter final judgment in civil matters, they exercise Article III
power and do not serve as mere adjuncts of the district courts.293
Moreover, “[t]he fact that the parties consent to a
magistrate . . . does not . . . obviate the Article III concerns.”294
Aside from the court’s facial concern with § 636(c), it
discussed the unique separation of powers implication when
magistrate judges adjudicate § 2255 motions.295 The court
objected to the quasi-appellate nature of this review and noted
the hindrance it has on the district court’s reviewability and
control.296 With this in mind, the court emphasized the lack of
supervision by the district courts, noting a hallmark of the
magistrate judge system is district court review and
supervision, not magistrate judge independence.297 Because a
final order by a magistrate judge under consent jurisdiction is
only reviewable by the circuit court, the district court is stripped
of its supervision beyond constitutional limits.298 Even though
the court ultimately declined to rule on the constitutional
question, the sentiment was clear—magistrate judge
adjudication of § 2255 motions under § 636(c) is not
constitutionally permissible.299

292. See id. (discussing the Supreme Court’s holding in Stern).
293. See id. (“Instead, magistrate judges exercise the judicial Power of the
United States, despite the fact that they lack Article III protections.” (internal
quotations and citation omitted)).
294. Id. at 1070.
295. Id.
296. See id. at 1070–71 (“It is axiomatic that non-Article III judges may
not revise or overturn Article III judgments.”).
297. See id. at 1071 (relying on the rules for filing appeals of § 636(c)
judgments for support).
298. See id. at 1071–72 (noting the limited appellate review of judgments
made under § 636(c) jurisdiction). This lack of review reduces the district
court’s control at the end of the proceeding, divesting the court of its Article
III control. Id.
299. See id. at 1072 (invalidating the practice on statutory grounds).
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Can Magistrate Judges Constitutionally Dispose of § 2255
Motions?

It is important to state that this Note is not suggesting
§ 636(c) is facially unconstitutional.300 Rather, § 636(c)
jurisdiction is unconstitutional when used to adjudicate § 2255
motions.301 Magistrate judge review of § 2255 motions concern
more than a non-Article III adjudicator exercising Article III
power.302 Here, a non-Article III judge has the final word on
whether an Article III judge’s prior determination is correct.
This situation ignores the characteristics that distinguish
Article III judges and protects them from encroachment by the
other branches.303 It also shifts reviewability and supervision
away from Article III and into the hands of the magistrate
judge.304
1.

The Schor Factors Test

The factors from Schor, as applied by the majority in
Wellness, show magistrate judge adjudication of § 2255
proceedings violates separations of power.305 First, Article III
judges retain very little supervision over the adjudication of
§ 2255 motions by magistrate judges.306 The only review of a
magistrate judge’s final order is a discretionary appeal to the
court of appeals for the circuit in which the district sits.307 Even
though district courts retain power ex ante to appoint and refer
§ 2255 motions to magistrates, once a magistrate judge enters a
300. But see id. at 1068 (“At the outset, we harbor serious concerns as to
the facial constitutionality of § 636(c).”).
301. See United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 372 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the practice violates Article III separation of powers).
302. See Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1070 (11th Cir. 2014)
(noting the unique separation of powers concerns involved).
303. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
304. See Johnston, 258 F.3d at 370 (describing how magistrate judges now
review the district court judge).
305. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
307. See Johnston, 258 F.3d at 370 (discussing the appeal procedure once
a magistrate judge entered the final order); 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) (providing
the same appeal structure as if a district judge enters the final order).
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final order, the district court lacks all review. 308 Ironically, it is
the magistrate judge who is given the power to review the
Article III judge,309 turning reviewability on its head and further
removing the district judge from the proceeding.310
Second, as discussed,311 the right to post-conviction relief
under § 2255 is a “fundamental precept to liberty.”312 Because
habeas corpus is so vital, it cannot be suspended unless it falls
into a narrow exception and is approved by Congress.313
Section 2255 became an important way to enforce that right
while addressing the “practical difficulties that had arisen in
administering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal
courts.”314 The enactment of § 2255 did not alter the remedy
available to federal prisoners challenging their convictions.315
Thus, § 2255 has the same level of importance and
fundamentality as any other habeas statute, counseling against
delegation of it to non-Article III judges.
Finally, Congress’ reasons for expanding magistrate judge
jurisdiction under § 636(c) do not outweigh the significant
erosion of Article III power. Congress expanded magistrate
judge jurisdiction to allow litigants increased access to federal
courts.316 The goal of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1979 was to

308. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
309. See Johnston, 258 F.3d at 369 (“If the parties to a § 2255 motion
consent to proceed before a magistrate judge, that magistrate judge could
attack the validity of an Article III judge’s rulings. Such an act clearly raises
Article III concerns . . . .”).
310. See id. (criticizing situations where a magistrate judge exercises more
control over the district judge).
311. See supra Part II.C.
312. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008) (discussing habeas
corpus during the framing of the Constitution).
313. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it.”).
314. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952) (providing
background on § 2255).
315. See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962) (“[The] remedy
[under § 2255 is] exactly commensurate with . . . [what] had previously been
available by habeas corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was
confined.”).
316. See supra notes 178–179 and accompanying text.
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protect individuals from the “vicissitudes of adjudication delay
and expense.”317 This was because of a “mounting queue of civil
cases” building in the district courts.318 These legislative goals
are weighed against the infringement on Article III power. 319
Adjudication of § 2255 motions under § 636(c) places a
non-Article III magistrate judge in a quasi-appellate capacity,
vesting her with Article III power and stripping the Article III
court of all review and supervision.320 Judicial efficiency must
give way when a constitutional infringement is this great.321
Taken together, the Schor factors suggest delegation of § 2255
motions to magistrate judges impermissibly infringes on Article
III power and violates structural separation of powers.
Besides the Schor factors, final disposition of § 2255
motions impermissibly involve magistrate judges in felony
criminal proceedings.322 As the court in Johnston explained,
felony criminal trials and sentencing are the exclusive domain
of Article III judges.323 Allowing the adjudication of § 2255
motions by magistrate judges to continue “may unwittingly
embroil a magistrate judge in the unconstitutional conduct of a
felony trial . . . .”324 This situation alone creates a constitutional
317. See S. REP. NO. 96-74, at 4 (1979), as reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1469, 1472 (explaining the reasoning for expanding magistrate judge
jurisdiction).
318. Id.
319. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1945
(2015) (comparing the goals of Congress in increasing bankruptcy jurisdiction
with the constitutional concerns the expansion creates).
320. See id. at 1959 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Of course, it ‘goes without
saying’ that practical considerations of efficiency and convenience cannot
trump the structural protections of the Constitution.” (citations omitted)).
321. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629 (1952)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (“The doctrine of the separation of powers was
adopted by the Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude
the exercise of arbitrary power.” (citation omitted)).
322. See United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 370 (5th Cir. 2001)
(noting that one of the troubling parts of magistrate judge disposition of § 2255
motions is their involvement in felony trials). But cf. Peretz v. United States,
501 U.S. 923, 924–25 (1991) (permitting magistrate judges to supervise felony
trial voir dire).
323. See Johnston, 258 F.3d at 370 (discussing the separation of powers
implications of having a non-Article III judge preside over a felony trial).
324. Id. at 369–70.
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concern.325 And permitting magistrate judges to make
determinations in felony cases ex post does not diminish the
interference with Article III.326 In sum, the Schor factors and
the degree of involvement in felony cases suggest that
magistrate judge adjudication of § 2255 motions under consent
jurisdiction violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
2.

Consent

Since the Schor factors suggest a violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers, the question becomes whether consent can
diminish or cure this violation. In Savoca v. United States,327 the
district court upheld the constitutionality of magistrate judge
disposition of § 2255 motions because of party consent.328 Savoca
and his co-conspirator proceeded pro se, challenging their
sentences as unconstitutional.329 Savoca separately challenged
the circumstances of his conviction.330 Both consented to
jurisdiction under § 636(c).331 In an opinion addressing Savoca’s
motion to withdraw that consent, District Judge Marrero
adopted Magistrate Judge Lisa Margaret Smith’s Report and
Recommendation (R&R).332
Savoca relied on the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Johnston
to argue Magistrate Judge Smith’s adjudication of his § 2255

325. See United Stated v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 1997) (“We
doubt that Article III will permit a non-Article III judge to preside over a felony
trial.”).
326. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
327. 199 F. Supp. 3d 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
328. See id. at 725 (“[T]he structural protections provided by Article III are
guaranteed in this instance for all the same reasons they are guaranteed in
all other instances of referrals pursuant to § 636(c)(1).”).
329. See id. at 719 (recognizing their complaints were filed under § 2255).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 719–20.
332. See id. at 719 (denying Savoca’s motion to withdraw consent).
Magistrate Judge Smith was the magistrate judge that Savoca had consented
to. Id. It seems odd that a district judge would refer this motion to the same
magistrate judge, given Savoca’s main argument was that she lacked the
constitutional authority to adjudicate his § 2255 motion. See id. at 721–22.
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motion was unconstitutional.333 In her R&R, Magistrate Judge
Smith said party consent moots all individual separation of
powers concerns.334 Because Savoca knowingly and voluntarily
consented,335 no separation of powers concerns were present.336
Judge Smith compared magistrates adjudicating § 2255
motions with magistrates adjudicating § 1983 actions.337 In
making that comparison, her focus was only on separation of
powers as it pertains to delegation of Article III power to a
non-Article III judge.338 In fact, she disposed of the true issue
(having a magistrate judge review and overturn a district

333. See id. (citing the separation of powers argument advanced by the
court in Johnston).
334. See id. at 722 (stating that litigant may waive their personal right to
an Article III adjudicator).
335. Id. Of relevance is that litigant consent under § 636(c) only needs to
be implied. Cf. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1948
(2015) (permitting implied consent for bankruptcy claims). Like Savoca, many
§ 2255 litigants are pro se and do not know about the differences or
implications of having a magistrate judge adjudicate their motion. See Lee
Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 VA. L. REV. 61, 90 (2011) (finding that,
on average, from 1998 to 2007, only 2.1 percent of non-capital prisoners
seeking habeas relief had an attorney representing them). This indicates
implied consent, even for individual constitutional protections, may be
insufficient in the context of § 2255. See Anderson v. Woodcreek Venture Ltd.,
351 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We are similarly troubled by the failure of
the magistrate judge and district court judge to ‘advise [Anderson] [the pro se
litigant] that [she was] free to withhold consent without adverse substantive
consequences.’” (citation omitted)).
336. See Savoca, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 723 (finding that so long as the parties’
consent and the district court retains supervision over the process, there are
no structural implications when a magistrate judge adjudicates a § 2255
motion).
337. See id. (citing Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 109–10 (2d Cir. 1984)
(permitting magistrate judges to enter final judgment in § 1983 actions)).
What this comparison ignores is that adjudication of a § 1983 action does not
require a magistrate judge to review and potentially overturn an Article III
judge’s prior determination. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
338. See Savoca v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 3d 716, 723 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(applying the Collins decision in the context of an “Article III ban on the
delegation of judicial power to non-Article III judges”).
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judge’s prior determination) by saying even if the practice is
“awkward or ill-advised,” it does not violate the Constitution.339
The R&R concluded that even if structural separation of
powers concerns exist, Savoca’s consent along with the district
court’s delegation and supervision, cure any defect.340 Concern
over the lack of reviewability was mitigated because appeals are
brought to an Article III appellate court.341 Thus, there was still
review by an Article III judge.342 What this argument fails to
acknowledge is circuit review is discretionary, not mandatory.343
And shifting the reviewability burden to circuit courts does little
for judicial efficiency, the primary goal of increased magistrate
judge jurisdiction.344 In the end, Savoca held the complete
opposite of Johnston and failed to address the statutory issue
resolved in Brown. What it does show is how consent affects
constitutional implications when magistrates adjudicate § 2255
motions under consent jurisdiction.345
The majority and dissent in Wellness agree parties can
never fully consent to structural separation of powers

339. See id. at 724 n.12 (internal quotations and citation omitted) (noting
that the situation did not present itself here because the original sentencing
judge had retired from the bench before Magistrate Judge Smith decided the
§ 2255 motion).
340. See id. at 723 (interpreting the Wellness majority as permitting
consent to cure all separation of powers concerns if there is some supervisory
authority by Article III).
341. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) (detailing the appeal process from a
magistrate judge’s final order).
342. See Savoca, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 725 (“There is no principled reason to
believe this method [circuit court review] is unconstitutional as applied to
§ 2255 motions but not as applied to other ‘civil matters.’”).
343. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
344. See S. REP. NO. 96-74, at 3 (1979), as reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1469, 1470–72 (discussing how the purpose of § 636(c) was to reduce the
“mounting queue of civil cases” in the district courts). The reviewability
Magistrate Judge Smith suggests would shift that queue to the circuit courts,
or altogether ignore it, which would provide reviewability only in theory. See
Savoca, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 723 (arguing that the practice is constitutional
because Article III still has some review mechanism).
345. See Savoca, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 723 (relying on Wellness consent to
cure any constitutional defects).
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violations.346 Still, the majority acknowledges that party
consent can diminish a structural violation.347 The dissent, on
the other hand, reminded the majority that when the executive
and legislative branches consented to bypassing bicameralism
and presentment with the line-item veto, the Court invalidated
the Act.348 Similarly, the one-house legislative veto was struck
down, despite both branches consenting.349 Thus, party consent
does not affect whether a structural violation occurred.350
Despite the Court’s statement in Wellness that party
consent can diminish separation of powers concerns, consent is
unlikely to cure the constitutional violations present when
magistrate judges adjudicate § 2255 motions. Having
magistrates review and overturn district judge-imposed
sentences is a more significant constitutional violation than
bankruptcy judges adjudicating a state law claim. In the context
of § 2255 motions and consent jurisdiction, district judges retain
far less supervision over magistrate judges and Article III power
is further removed from the district courts. This means even if
consent has some effect on structural separation of powers
concerns, the magnitude of the violation here is too great for
consent to cleanse it.

346. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1945 n.10
(2015) (majority opinion) (stating that Sharif’s consent is not curing a
structural violation, rather his consent “shows . . . why no such violation has
occurred”); id. at 1956 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that just as
consent cannot confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a federal court, consent
cannot usurp structural principles of separation of powers); Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850–51 (1986) (establishing
the rule).
347. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
348. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1988)
(invalidating the Line-Item Veto Act for violating structural separation of
powers principles).
349. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944–45 (1983) (striking down
Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for violating
separation of powers doctrine).
350. See Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1955 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (reminding
the majority “separation of powers does not depend on . . . whether the
encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment” (internal quotations and
citations omitted)).
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Avoiding Statutory and Constitutional Concerns Going
Forward

Given that magistrate judge jurisdiction has gone
unchanged since 1979, amending § 636(c) to exclude § 2255
proceedings is unlikely.351 The more probable scenario is the
Supreme Court granting certiorari in a case involving a
challenge to magistrate judge authority to enter final judgment
in a § 2255 proceeding. If this happens, the Court should find
the practice statutorily and constitutionally impermissible for
the reasons previously stated.352 The ideal solution, once the
court limits jurisdiction over § 2255 motions, would be to limit
magistrate judge involvement in these proceedings to issuing
report and recommendations.353 Other proposed solutions are
discussed in Part V.A.
A.

Proposed Solutions

There are several possibilities for solving the problem of
magistrate judge adjudication of § 2255 motions under § 636(c).
One of the more radical solutions is to amend the Constitution
to permit magistrate judges to exercise Article III power. 354 This
would provide them with the constitutional protections afforded
to Article III judges and alleviate concern over the authority of
magistrate judges to enter final judgment in § 2255
proceedings.355 That said, given the difficult amendment

351. See Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636) (providing the last substantive
change by Congress to magistrate judge jurisdiction).
352. See supra Parts III.B, IV.D.
353. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (permitting a district judge to have a
magistrate “submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and
recommendations for . . . disposition”).
354. See Benjamin P.D. Mejia, Note, Magistrates After Arkison &
Wellness: The Outer Limits of Consent, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 509,
549–50 (2016) (providing proposed amendment language). Mejia suggests
language such as “Congress may establish procedures by which Article III
judges may appoint Article I judges . . . subject to the control of Article III
courts, may exercise Article III judicial power.” Id.
355. See id. (including life tenure and protection from salary diminution).
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process, this solution is unrealistic and would take too long to
implement.356
Another solution is to make all magistrate judges district
judges. This would alleviate any concern over magistrate judges
wielding Article III power since they would now be Article III
judges.357 Like the amendment solution, it would be difficult to
formally appoint and confirm all currently serving magistrate
judges.358 With the backlog of current judicial appointments,359
adding appointees may cause chaos in an already uneconomical
and partisan process.360 In the end, this solution will only
increase inefficiency and create a “mounting queue” of § 2255
motions in the district courts while Congress resolves the
issue.361 The pitfalls of these potential solutions show the best
way to allow magistrate judges to constitutionally be involved
in § 2255 proceedings is to limit them to issuing R&Rs.
B.

Best Approach: Report and Recommendations

Limiting magistrate judges to issuing R&Rs in § 2255
proceedings preserves the rights of mostly pro se litigants,
maintains separation of powers, and ensures judicial efficiency.
District judges review R&Rs de novo, 362 allowing an Article III
356. See Jonathan L. Marshfield, The Amendment Effect, 98 B.U. L. REV.
55, 58 (2018) (discussing the difficult process of amending the Constitution).
357. See United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 367 (5th Cir. 2001)
(noting that to comply with separation of powers principles the essential
attributes of judicial power must remain with Article III judges).
358. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (prescribing appointment and confirmation
process).
359. See Riley T. Svikhart, “Major Questions” as Major Opportunities, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1873, 1891 (2018) (discussing the backlog of President
Trump’s judicial nominations).
360. See Carl Tobias, Filling the Judicial Vacancies in a Presidential
Election Year, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 985, 988 (2012) (describing the “partisan
divisiveness” involved in judicial nominations).
361. See S. REP. NO. 96-74, at 3 (1979), as reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1469, 1470–72 (discussing the purpose behind increasing magistrate judge
jurisdiction).
362. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specific proposed findings or
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judge to supervise and review the magistrate judge. R&Rs also
reduce the time a district judge must devote to a case and
provides for efficient disposition of § 2255 petitions, consistent
with Congress’ goals when enacting § 636(c).363 Many district
courts already limit magistrate judge involvement in § 2255
proceedings to issuing R&Rs and have suffered no backlog of
§ 2255 motions.364 Indeed, the Magistrate Judge Committee
prefers that magistrates issue R&Rs in § 2255 proceedings,
rather than adjudicate the motions under § 636(c).365
If § 2255 motions are classified as criminal proceedings,
R&Rs under § 636(b)(1)(B) can provide an efficient and
constitutional way to delegate § 2255 motions to magistrate
judges without impermissibly involving them in felony trials
and sentencing.366 In short, limiting magistrate judges to
issuing R&Rs in § 2255 motions allows Article III judges to
retain reviewability and supervision without overburdening the
district courts and creating judicial inefficiency.

recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court
may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made the magistrate judge.
363. See Mejia, supra note 354, at 542 (proposing limiting § 636
jurisdiction to R&Rs because it keeps with Congress’ goal of judicial
efficiency); Robbins, supra note 12, at VI.2 (suggesting R&Rs as a solution
because they are only a minor alteration from § 636(c) adjudication).
364. See Robbins, supra note 12, at VI.2 (noting that many district courts
already exclusively use R&Rs for § 2255 motions and other jurisdictions would
be unaffected by limiting magistrate judges in this area).
365. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
366. See § 636(b)(1)(B)
[A] [district] judge may also designate a magistrate judge to conduct
hearings . . . to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of
facts and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the
court, of any motion . . . made by individuals convicted of criminal
offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of
confinement.
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VI.

Conclusion

As § 2255 motions continue to be filed at commensurate
levels year-over-year,367 the need for the Supreme Court to give
a definite answer on the scope of magistrate judge jurisdiction
is imperative. By clarifying whether § 636(c) statutorily and
constitutionally allows adjudication of § 2255 motions, the
Supreme Court will provide district courts with guidance on
how to continue to use magistrate judges. Should the Supreme
Court invalidate the practice, Congress or the courts should
limit magistrate judge involvement in § 2255 proceedings to
issuing R&Rs, achieving judicial efficiency and constitutional
compliance.

367. Compare ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, tbl.C-2 (2019), https://perma.cc/PXH8-KY2S (showing
5,335 § 2255 motions were filed in district courts between June 30, 2018 and
June 30, 2019), with ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, tbl.4.4 (2018), https://perma.cc/W33W-JPVF (PDF)
(reporting that 5,342 § 2255 motions were filed in district courts for fiscal year
2018).

